Weltschau

The local elections held on March 31, 2024, had significant implications for the political landscape of Turkey. The significant triumph of the primary opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), in crucial provinces of Turkey has raised noteworthy inquiries that warrant attention from astute political science observers. This brief article will discuss my reflections on the election and analyse the factors contributing to the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) defeat, rather than focusing on the victory of the CHP.

The Dynamics of the Results of the Elections on March 31, 2024

The Sociological Dynamics:

1) The socio-economic situation and political landscape preceding the March 31, 2024, elections can be compared to those of Turkey in 2001 and the 2002 Turkish general elections, which marked the AK Party’s coming to power. The 2001 crisis had profound repercussions on politics, and there is a strikingly similar situation in Turkey immediately preceding the local elections on March 31, 2024. Per contra, the decline in the purchasing power of the people today is significantly greater than during the 2001 crisis. Turkey currently ranks among the top countries in the world in terms of high inflation, even food inflation. Furthermore, the issue of housing scarcity is progressively worsening, with urban dwellers experiencing its impact more intensely than the ones of rural dwellers. This led to a significant shift in public support away from the AK Party.

2) The ruling party’s 21-year tenure, coupled with the consolidation of factions within party organisations and their conflicts over resource allocation, have resulted in the party becoming disconnected from the populace.

3) Due to the shift in the sociological composition of the AK Party and Turkey as a whole, the AK Party is no longer able to form robust connections with the vast majority of people it relies on, particularly in the realm of identity politics, as it did in the past. The relationship between the AK Party and the lower and middle classes in the outskirts of the city, which was formed through Islam and patronage during their time in power, has undergone changes and is not the same as it was before. This class, which grew wealthier with the AK Party, has moved into the middle class category; however, this defeat can be attributed in part to the declining patronage brought about by Turkey’s shifting political landscape, the fact that these classes are impacted by the country’s economic circumstances, and their incapacity to forge positive relationships with the party.

4) A further point about the third point was that populism was used by the AK Party to defend its own supporters. The attempt by the party was to exert control over Turkey by polarizing it through contrasts like Islam-secular, modern-anti-modern. It is a fact that the party used this tactic successfully for quite a while. Over a span of 20 years, the conservative segment has become prevalent in all aspects of society and business, collaborating with the modern and urban masses. The act of collectively experiencing and embracing the nation’s suffering and destiny has resulted in a significant advancement in social cohesion and the concept of citizenship. The AK Party elite, who relied on populism, overlooked this fact in the recent elections.

The Dynamics in the Political Domain:

1) The most important dynamic in the political arena on March 31, 2024, was the charisma of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. It is also important to note that he has established strong relationships with all segments of politics, including the centre-right political spectrum from which he comes. One of the factors contributing to the victory is the support garnered from the Kurdish movement and the Good Party’s (the İYİ Party’s) base, which represents centre-right and nationalist voters and has been incorporated into the CHP.

2) Another contributing factor to the victory was Ekrem İmamoğlu’s ability to persuade the Re-Welfare Party (YRP), an Islamist party, to not align with the ruling bloc. This allowed him to attract votes that might have otherwise gone to the AK Party, bolstering his own party’s support. The YRP’s vote share in Kayseri, a stronghold of the AK Party, and its victory in the mayoral race in a significant city like Urfa demonstrate the validity of this assessment. The YRP’s situation mirrors that of the Young Party, which removed the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) from parliament in 2002 through its significant vote share, leading the AK Party to rise to power.

3) One of the key factors in the CHP’s victory was the meticulous selection of candidates and the choice of strong contenders who, regardless of their ideologies, could support society more than the party.

Altering Geopolitical Concerns and Reflection of the Inter-Elite Struggle on the Ballot Box

1) It appears inevitable that the United States will adopt a nationalist stance and prioritise the South China Sea in its foreign policy in the event of a potential Trump victory. Given this, there is a good chance that the United States will leave the Middle East. The United States desires to delegate to Turkey the responsibility of safeguarding the Kurds in northern Iraq and Syria. To accomplish this, Turkey must nevertheless initiate a fresh opening process with the Kurds residing within its borders. This state of affairs gives rise to a philosophical problem with the AK party’s coalition partner, the Turkish nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and brings about conflict within the state bureaucracy. Indeed, there were rumours circulating behind closed doors that the AK Party, following the local administrative elections, would dissolve its coalition and establish a novel alliance with the İYİ party and the pro-Kurdish Party DEM. It is also true that local elections reflect this conflict. These include, for instance, the two parties’ inability to nominate common candidates in numerous cities and their unwillingness to endorse one another’s nominees in areas where common candidates have been proposed.

Consequently, life won’t be easy for the AK Party from this day forward. There exists a sociological and political domain that goes beyond its own policies and is undergoing transformation. We will observe the process leading up to the general elections with keen interest.

Prof. Dr. Rasim Özgür Dönmez

I am a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at Abant İzzet Baysal University, Bolu. My area of expertise is conflict dynamics, social mobilisation, and political violence. Some of my scholarly works are: “Neoliberalism and Global Insecurities: Thinking Resilience/Resistance in Turkey”, “Waves of Social Movement Mobilizations in the 21st Century: Challenges to the Neo-Liberal World Order and Democracy (with N. Konak, E. Castaneda, L. R. D. Cepeda, and G. B. Goularas)”, “Gendered Identities: Criticizing Patriarchy in Turkey (with F. A. Özmen, C. A. Akman, V. Irtis, G. B. Goularas)”, “Nation-Building and Turkish Modernization: Islam, Islamism, and Nationalism in Turkey (with A. Yaman)” and “Societal Peace and Ideal Citizenship for Turkey (with P. Enneli, C. A. Akman, E. Aktoprak and M. Arakon)”.